In this paper, we investigate the effect of euphoria on returns derived by Indian companies in their cross-border acquisitions. Cognitive legitimacy generated at the country level facilitated firms in deriving higher value from internationalization. In addition, overoptimism after the legitimacy-building event led to euphoria in financial markets and short-term abnormal returns. Hence we argue that the springboard effect created by legitimacy is short-lived, as euphoria fades away over time. Using cross-border and domestic acquisitions by Indian companies during 1999-2009, and controlling for fundamental factors, both financial and non-financial, we find support for our euphoria hypothesis. Because of overoptimism, Indian companies experienced short-term abnormal returns in their cross-border acquisitions in the few years following the legitimation process, but not in later years.
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen a rapid internationalization of emerging-market (EM) firms (UNCTAD, 2011) . In the global business environment, these EM firms face several issues in the nascent internationalization stage due to their linkages with their home country (Stillman, 1974) . One of the critical issues faced by multinational enterprises, often underscored in the literature, involves the establishment and maintenance of legitimacy in foreign markets (Klossek et al., 2012; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Liao and Yu, 2012) . Legitimacy is central in the milieu of institutions that define the rules of the game in international markets (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Davis et al., 2000) , and firms need to achieve taken-for-grantedness in these foreign markets (Guillén and García-Canal, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007) . However, authors in international business research have struggled to explain why legitimacy created in the business environment has no discernible impact after the initial observation of the legitimacy-creating phenomenon. This paper addresses this issue by linking the observed negligible effect of legitimacy to the euphoria effect widely studied in other areas (Helwege and Liang, 2004; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2008; Steib and Mohan, 1997) . More specifically, we investigate this euphoria effect in the context of internationalization of Indian firms; i.e., how euphoria created in financial markets can generate abnormal returns for Indian companies in their foreign acquisitions and how this euphoria effect is short-lived.
The lack of legitimacy in the host country has been identified as one of the costs of doing business abroad, referred to as liabilities of foreignness (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Zaheer, 1995) . Since authors have emphasized the role of location in Dunning's OLI paradigm (Asmussen et al., 2011; Dunning, 2009) , liability of foreignness is considered to be both a country-level and firm-level construct (Beugelsdijk, 2011; Dunning and Lundan, 2008) . Indeed companies can overcome this liability of foreignness through both firmspecific (or ownership-specific) advantages and location-specific advantages. Moreover, this liability of foreignness impacts the returns of these companies. Thus, EM companies are required to cultivate legitimacy that will help them surmount drawbacks coupled with their country-of-origin and liability of foreignness (Bell et al., 2008; Klossek et al., 2012; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004) . Similarly, authors have looked at the legitimization process of Indian companies in foreign markets (Pant and Ramachandran, 2012) .
From the domestic country perspective, there are good grounds for believing that legitimacy generated in emerging markets will influence the tradeoffs between domestic and overseas investments. This has implications at a macroeconomic level as companies need to choose whether they will invest within their country or engage in outward investment (Gubbi et al., 2010) . Hence, it is important to examine the returns that these companies derive abroad vis-à-vis their domestic investments.
Our paper focuses on the following unanswered questions: Do Indian firms accrue value for their shareholders if they internationalize after the legitimation process? Do these returns hold over a period of time, i.e., is there a degree of persistence in the legitimacygenerated abnormal value or is it mainly driven by euphoria in financial markets? The legitimacy that we discuss in this paper is not grounded in firms but rather is in the air.
Legitimacy is created in the global business environment and Indian companies leverage it.
However such cognitive legitimacy brought about overoptimism, or euphoria, in financial markets and, like fragrance, it fades away after initial exuberance as Indian companies are unable to leverage it anymore.
We contribute to the narrative on organizational legitimacy and internationalization in two ways. First, our study shows that legitimacy created in the global business environment can impel organizations from EM to create value for their shareholders via cross-border acquisitions. Second, we use the euphoria effect to explain the temporal limitations on the leverage of legitimacy in these cross-border acquisitions.
Cross-border and domestic acquisitions by Indian companies form the empirical context of our study. In their internationalization process, Indian companies traditionally entered foreign markets through greenfield investments. However, a growing number of Indian companies alter their mode of entry into foreign markets, now adopting inorganic growth through overseas acquisitions (Gubbi et al., 2010; Hattari and Rajan, 2010; Kumar, 2008) . 1 We use the time period 1999-2009 to undertake our empirical analysis. This period has seen a built-up of internationalization process by Indian firms. As seen on Figure 1 (Panel A), the number and value of cross-border acquisitions have grown considerably since 2000.
Half way through the period, a Goldman Sachs report (Goldman Sachs, 2003) was published, which we argue creates a window of opportunity through legitimacy for Indian firms in their overseas acquisitions. The fact that this report acted as a legitimacy-building event for Indian companies is justified by the literature, both academic and professional (Armijo, 2007; Bloomberg, 2003; Hult, 2009; Wansleben, 2013) , and motivated by informal discussions with Indian businesses. 2 Figure 1 (Panel B) shows the surge in cross-border deal announcementsand value -right after the publication of the report in October 2003. Thus, our choice of country and time window provides an excellent setting to investigate our hypotheses. While the contribution of this paper will be specific to the particular context of Indian companies, it represents a progression towards a better understanding of the process by which EM firms are able to overcome the liability of foreignness in international markets and how legitimacy that is grounded in the external environment generates positive effects for companies only in period of euphoria. 2000Q2  2000Q3  2000Q4  2001Q1  2001Q2  2001Q3  2001Q4  2002Q1  2002Q2  2002Q3  2002Q4  2003Q1  2003Q2  2003Q3  2003Q4  2004Q1  2004Q2  2004Q3  2004Q4  2005Q1  2005Q2  2005Q3  2005Q4  2006Q1  2006Q2  2006Q3  2006Q4  2007Q1  2007Q2  2007Q3  2007Q4  2008Q1  2008Q2  2008Q3  2008Q4  2009Q1  2009Q2  2009Q3 In the next section of the paper we formally develop our hypotheses using theory and empirical evidence on legitimacy and euphoria and follow it with details on data and methodology. Results of our analysis are presented in the subsequent part, and finally, we conclude with discussion of our results and avenues for future research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this paper, we focus on a legitimacy-creating event at the country-level and see how its impact trickles down to firm-level. This is consistent with the institutional approach of organizational legitimacy, i.e., the existence of an exogenous legitimacy-building event that can affect how people understand and evaluate organizations (Suchman, 1995) . The idea is that Indian companies are able to gain credibility and comprehensibility in the global environment, in line with the cognitive definition of legitimacy (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995) . Pant and Ramachandran (2012) also argue that Indian firms are able to achieve cognitive legitimacy in their cross-border operations through what they call empirical credibility. Focusing on the software services industry, they show that empirical credibility was enhanced by the industry's focus on "compilation and dissemination of extensive statistics on software services firms that enabled stakeholders to develop credible images of the Indian software industry". Moreover, they emphasize the importance of industry studies published by consulting firms such as McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group that have substantial referent power in the host country's institutional environment.
Similarly, our legitimacy-creating event for Indian acquirers is the publication of a Goldman Sachs report (Goldman Sachs, 2003) considered as the first study assessing the tremendous growth potential of India and other BRIC countries. The economic liberalization of several emerging economies in the East (Ahlstrom et al., 2008) and the arrival of new transition economies of Eastern Europe in the 1980s-1990s have created a buzz in the global business environment. At that time, the idea that trade liberalization and other moves to free up markets would generate a growth take-off represented a hope rather than a well-founded expectation (Krugman, 1995) . Moreover, liberalization policies might not necessarily encourage companies to go abroad, even if they can act as enablers (Nayyar, 2008) .
It was noted that prior to 2003 much of the excitement about the new members of the global order was relatively muted (Goldman Sachs, 2003) . Most of these emerging economies were pertinent for cheap labor and raw material, among others factors (Miller et al., 2008b) . These emerging economies were leveraged by developed-economy firms for their demographic dividends, with a large number of young people forming part of their sweatshops. Though in some developing countries it had generated disposable income and improved the quality of life for citizens, it had done very little otherwise.
The Goldman Sachs report altered the world vision. The countries in the periphery of the global business community were suddenly catapulted to the center of world discussion (Goldman Sachs, 2003; Rasiah et al., 2010) . As soon as the report went public, Bloomberg
Businessweek published an article stating that "the provocative conclusions, which initially stemmed from a demographic study, are already attracting wide interest" (Bloomberg, 2003) .
Although the Goldman Sachs report equally praises all BRIC countries, we believe its impact was strongest for Indian companies. For instance, China was already more advanced in terms of reform process, financial liberalization, openness to foreign investment, and organizational legitimacy (Huang and Khanna, 2003; Purushothaman, 2004 (Bonaglia et al., 2007) . Indeed a direct consequence of this exogenous legitimacy building is the sudden increase in outward foreign direct investment, and more specifically overseas acquisitions, from Indian companies (Gammeltoft, 2008; Kumar, 2008) .
In India, cross-border acquisitions increased dramatically after 2003, mostly to gain market access to developed countries (Rasiah et al., 2010) . Other authors have commented on the fact that Indian cross-border acquisitions have picked up from the year 2003 (Kohli and Mann, 2012) , although they have not explored the reasons for this growth in acquisitions. We argue that those companies choosing to internationalize were able to channelize cognitive legitimacy developed by this report in the international business environment and generate value in their inorganic growth. This gain in credibility should mostly benefit cross-border acquisitions. Hence, following previous studies (Gubbi et al., 2010; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) we define the cross-border effect as the difference between the average abnormal return of foreign acquisitions and the average abnormal return of domestic transactions. Based on previous discussion and definition, we expect a positive cross-border effect to exist only after the legitimacy-building event:
Hypothesis 1. After Indian firms gained cognitive legitimacy in the global environment, they experienced greater abnormal returns from their cross-border acquisitions as compared to their domestic acquisitions.
Some of these acquisitions have been very high profile and have led to a perception of value-generating propositions in Indian business world (Khanna and Palepu, 2010) . This could have also led to the creation of a euphoria effect in these initial acquisitions undertaken by Indian companies. Indeed, Indian companies prior to the fiscal policy liberalization and trade policy changes faced rather restrictive policies at home and could not invest in global markets (Gubbi et al., 2010) . Hence, the Indian stock market rewarded pioneering crossborder acquisitions with higher premium driven by a novelty factor and bullish investment environment. A euphoria effect exists when something is done for the first time in the market.
The results of such new activities unascertainable by the market can generate substantial interest and excitement. There is evidence that the Goldman Sachs report created country- Such euphoria has been observed in other circumstances. For instance, authors have talked about the reunification euphoria in German stock markets after the reunification of East and West Germany (Brooks et al., 2005; Steib and Mohan, 1997; Sultan, 1995) . Minsky (2008) has mentioned the cycle of overestimation of expected returns, i.e., a phase of intense euphoria and bandwagon effect followed by a period of profit taking and finally, the cycle is completed with the recognition that earlier expectations were unjustified.
In the behavioural corporate finance literature, such euphoria exists when investors and/or managers exhibit overoptimism. Investor sentiment is when investors react to factors other than the value created by the corporate decision (e.g. merger, initial public offering, earnings announcement, stock splits, dividend payment). There is evidence that shareholder reaction to a corporate announcement is affected by investor sentiment, and that the stock price sensitivity to good news is greater during high sentiment periods (Helwege and Liang, 2004; Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2008 ).
Manager optimism can take different forms, e.g. bidders succumb to hubris and acquire overpriced targets with limited worth for the acquiring company (Roll, 1986) .
Managers engage in a lax assessment of the target company and might underestimate the challenges of integration in overseas acquisitions. Overall, stock market bolstered acquisitions are fraught with overvaluations and unlikely to realize full value for the acquiring firms. This kind of exuberance can result in financial cycle related acquisitions (Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1991; Pangarkar and Lie, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) . Highequity market cycles are closely accompanied with positive economic outlook. During such high-equity market cycles, similar to the one witnessed in India after the publication of the Goldman Sachs report, managers pursue aggressive and risky acquisitions. All through the low-equity market cycle, managers act conservatively. They either resist from undertaking acquisitions or scale-down the price that they pay for their transactions (Pangarkar and Lie, 2004) . 3 Thus the existence of euphoria in the home market (either from managers or from investors) will lead to an overestimation of expected returns in the short-run.
Our euphoria argument is also consistent with neoclassical theory suggesting that the occurrence of acquisitions is a consequence of economic shocks (Harford, 2005; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) . If we consider the Goldman Sachs report as a country-wide economic shock, such economic disturbance brings about an increase in share prices, which causes shareholders to update their expectations. Such shock potentially increases acquisition synergies and creates a hot market, implying that bidder stock prices are more likely to increase when a deal is announced in a market where recent acquisitions by other firms have been received well (Rosen, 2006) .
Finally, another argument for this aggressive cross-border activity from Indian companies is the pressure from global markets to internationalize. Firms that experience low growth opportunities or that nurse world-stage aspirations look at acquisitions as a mechanism to springboard themselves into global markets and derive higher growth opportunities (Kim et al., 2011; Luo and Tung, 2007) . But faced with pressures to grow fast, access international markets or acquire strategic assets, bidders might undertake lower than optimal examination of target countries or companies and overvalue the acquisitions. Thus, due to overoptimism in their domestic market and external pressure to internationalize rapidly and acquire strategic resources, many managers resulted in overpaying their acquisitions as they were less inclined to scrutinize potential targets for synergies. As many of these postacquisition disasters are well-documented in the media, financial markets might be unenthusiastic to future overseas investments once the initial magic of cross-border acquisitions fades.
Thus, this euphoria effect is a relevant matter in this discourse on cross-border premium that companies can generate on the stock market due to legitimacy generated in the business environment. Because of euphoria, we argue that investors and/or managers overreacted to the Goldman Sachs report and that abnormal returns owned from cross-border acquisitions existed only in the few years following the report. In other words, deals announced around 2004-2006 experienced higher abnormal returns than deals announced in later years.
Hypothesis 2. The euphoria effect is short-lived, i.e., Indian companies earned abnormal returns in their cross-border acquisitions only in the few years following the legitimacybuilding event.
It is also possible that firms belonging to different sectors will behave differently under similar business conditions. It is also likely that firms in some sectors will be able to experience integration synergies and/or negative effects sooner than other sectors. For instance, it has been observed that Indian service sector firms gain the positive benefits of internationalization sooner than manufacturing firms due to quicker assimilation of social and relational capital due to service firms' superior capabilities compared to manufacturing sector (Contractor et al., 2007) . Similarly, authors have suggested that the initial profitability loss from internationalization of firms is higher for manufacturing firms as opposed to service sector firms. Also, prior to the liberalization of the Indian economy, several manufacturing firms experienced local monopoly effects and did not engage actively in technology upgradation and internationalization (Gubbi et al., 2010) . Hence, it is possible that service firms in India have already created legitimacy for themselves in the foreign markets before the legitimacy-building event discussed in this paper. Manufacturing firms, on the other hand, could mostly benefit from this legitimation in global markets. Thus, it is pertinent to examine whether manufacturing firms experienced a greater euphoria effect:
Hypothesis 3: Manufacturing firms will experience stronger euphoria effect after the legitimacy-building event compared to other sectors.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We use Zephyr database to obtain data on Indian acquisitions from January 1999 to December 2009. We use three qualifying conditions for inclusion into our sample: the acquirer is listed on Bombay Stock Exchange, the acquirer acquires a majority stake in the target company and finally, the transaction is complete. In order to compute abnormal returns, we collect data on daily stock returns and daily market returns from Thomson DataStream. Dependent variable. We use cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) calculated over a 5-day window around the announcement date to assess the short-term performance of acquisitions. This method is similar to extant literature which focuses on the short-term impact of acquisitions on acquirers (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Doukas and Kan, 2006; Gubbi et al., 2010; Kohli and Mann, 2012; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) . This ex ante performance measure prior to the actual integration of the target has been demonstrated to link well with the ex post firm level outcomes (Haleblian et al., 2006; Kale et al., 2002; Pangarkar and Lie, 2004) . Moreover, this measure is relatively unbiased compared with other measures, and invariant to differences in national accounting standards (Cording et al., 2008; Gubbi et al., 2010) .
Independent variables. We test our first hypothesis using a dummy variable, CrossBorder, which takes value one if the acquirer takes over a foreign company, zero otherwise.
We test for the significance of this variable in impacting announcement returns over two subperiods corresponding to the years before and after the 2003 Goldman Sachs report. We expect that in the post-legitimacy period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ) this variable will have a positive and significant impact, stronger than in the pre-legitimacy period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . In order to test our second hypothesis, we need a measure of euphoria. 4 Since euphoria is related to overoptimism, we use relative trading volume (i.e., stock turnover) as a proxy for euphoria towards a particular acquirer. An abnormally high level of trading volume implies that investors are buying or selling the stock of the company in mass. If investors are particularly optimistic (pessimistic) about an acquisition, they will buy (sell) the stock, pushing its price (Lang et al., 1991; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) . At the deal level, Deal Value is the value of the transaction in billion dollars (Madura and Wiant, 1994) . Relative Size is the ratio of deal value to bidder market value of equity (Gubbi et al., 2010; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013) . Percentage Acquired controls for the variation in ownership concentration (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013) . Same Industry is a dummy which takes value one if both the acquirer and the target belong to the same industry group, zero otherwise (Denis et al., 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) . We also create a variable, Prior Experience, to indicate prior acquisition experience of acquirers in our sample (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013 ).
At the target country level, we use different measures of economic and social distance between India and the target country (Ghemawat, 2001; Gubbi et al., 2010; Khanna et al., 2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004; Tsang and Yip, 2007) . The dummy variable Same Language takes value one when both countries have the same official language (Brouthers, 2002; Demirbag et al., 2007; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985) . We also use a variable Forex to look at the impact of foreign exchange rate variation on announcement returns (Buckley et al., 2012) . Following Cakici et al. (1996) , Eun et al. (1996) and Kang (1993) , we calculate the relative strength of the exchange rate as the deviation of the foreign exchange rate at announcement date from its 12-month average. To control for foreign direct investment activity in India, we include a variable Inflow/Outflow which is the ratio of yearly inward investments to yearly outward investments from India (Buckley et al., 2012 We compute daily abnormal returns using a standard event study methodology (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Gubbi et al., 2010; Haleblian et al., 2006; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) . This methodology allows to test whether a specific event (the announcement of an acquisition) had a positive or negative impact on shareholder wealth (Aybar and Ficici, 2009 ). The expected returns for each stock are estimated according to the market model (MacKinlay, 1997):
where Rit is the daily return on the acquirer and Rmt is the daily return on the market portfolio.
The estimation period runs from 90 to 30 days before the announcement date. The coefficients i  and i  thus obtained are used to forecast the abnormal returns over each 5-day event window. The difference between the actual return and the expected return from the market model gives the daily abnormal stock return:
We then calculate the cumulative abnormal return for each deal (CARi) by accumulating the daily abnormal returns over the 5-day event window [-2; +2].
As an alternative method to compute abnormal returns, we use the modified market model also used in previous event studies (Bouwman et al., 2009; Brown and Warner, 1985) .
Instead of estimating expected returns over a pre-announcement period, the modified market model proxies the normal return of company i on day t with the market return on that day.
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We thus define abnormal returns for any day t as the difference between the bidder return and the market return:
We then test our hypotheses by assessing the cross-border effect using CARs in a univariate analysis; and regressing the CARs on our independent and control variables. For this last step, we run several cross-sectional regressions across various types of deals based on the following multivariate models:
Hypothesis 1:
This model is run over the total sample of domestic and cross-border deals. X is a vector representing all control variables discussed above, excluding country-level variables.
Hypotheses 2 and 3:
This model is run over the total sample of domestic and cross-border deals. 
RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlations between our variables are presented in Table 1 . Panel A presents the statistics across all transactions (both domestic and crossborder) whereas Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of cross-border deals only. With an average firm age of 35 years and a deviation of 24 years, our sample shows an eclectic mix of acquirers, some matured (e.g. Tata Group which is over a century old) and some quite young (e.g. ICICI Bank which was formed in the 1990s). In Panel B, the average CAR (1.8%) is much higher than in Panel A, suggesting that cross-border acquisitions on average earn higher abnormal returns than domestic acquisitions. However it is worth noting that the standard deviation of CARs is very close between both panels, implying that the variation in CARs is similar across domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
Looking at the correlation between our variables, CAR is positively correlated with CrossBorder, Relative Size, and especially Volume. Cross-Border is also positively correlated with Business Group and Percentage Acquired. Across our control variables, no correlation coefficient is above 0.37, ensuring minimum multicollinearity issues in the regression analysis. For information, the top three target countries are OECD countries (the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany).
Cross-border effect. In order to test Hypothesis 1, we use both univariate and multivariate analyses and split our sample into two sub-periods: before the publication of the Goldman Sachs report (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and after (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) . Table 2 reports the results for the univariate analysis, calculating 5-day CARs using either the market model without estimation period (Panel A) and with a 60-day estimation period (Panel B). As a robustness check, we create a matched sample of deals based on three criteria: both domestic and cross-border deals have to be generated from the same bidder's industry; the announcement dates of both deals have to be less than one year apart, and the difference between both bidder's size has to be as small as possible (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) .
Results for the matched sample are presented in Table 3 and are similar to those shown in Table 2 , i.e., we observe a cross-border effect only after the legitimacy-generating event. In order to test Hypothesis 1 in a multivariate framework, we regress individual CARs on the explanatory and control variables using OLS method. Several observations were dropped due to missing values. Results with robust standard errors obtained using Huber-White sandwich estimator are provided in Table 4 models (1) Euphoria effect. The other models in Table 4 provide a preliminary test for Hypothesis 2 on the total sample of domestic and cross-border acquisitions. In models (2) and (5), the cross-border effect is still stronger in the post-legitimacy period, even when accounting for abnormal trading volume. The Volume variable has a positive impact on CAR in both periods, although its statistical significance is higher after 2003. The positive coefficient is consistent with overoptimism in financial markets, i.e., investors react positively to the acquisition's announcement by buying the stock of the company in mass, creating short-term abnormal returns not explained by other fundamental factors. Models (3) and (6) allow us to test whether such overoptimism was higher for cross-border deals than for domestic ones. The variable of interest, Volume × Cross-Border, has a stronger impact on abnormal returns in the post-legitimacy period compared to the pre-legitimacy period. Next, we investigate the temporal limitation of the euphoria effect, i.e., the fact that overoptimism towards cross-border acquisitions was concentrated in the few years following the Goldman Sachs report. Table 5 average companies that bought domestically. One explanation for this could be that as value was being generated in overseas acquisitions (Roll, 1986) , bidders that invested in local markets were expected to succeed less than their globalizing counterparts. Though a mild cross-border effect is observed in 2009 (Panel A), this effect is no more significant when using a 60-day estimation period (Panel B).
6 Results for the multivariate analysis on cross-border deals over the whole sample period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , including Huber-White robust standard errors, are presented in Table 6 .
Reducing the sample to cross-border deals allows us to control for relevant country-level We conducted several robustness checks which are discussed in Appendix A for brevity. To summarize, we find support for our hypotheses, i.e., cross-border acquisitions by
Indian firms significantly benefited from increased legitimacy. Overall, these abnormal returns disappear after the initial euphoria created by the Goldman Sachs report, i.e., CARs become insignificant after 2006.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we look at how a legitimacy-building event can lead to short-term euphoria in Indian financial markets and follow-up adjustment in shareholders' value. As cross-border acquisitions imply a trade-off between domestic and foreign investments, with effects at a macro level, this is an important avenue for research at a time when many emerging markets are experiencing rapid growth (Gubbi et al., 2010) .
In our study, organizational legitimacy is generated at the country level due to activities exogenous to individual firms. We argue that the publication of the 2003 Goldman Sachs report on BRIC countries was a game-changer for Indian companies in their internationalization process (Goldman Sachs, 2003; Rasiah et al., 2010) . This report had a major impact on reducing the opportunity cost vis-à-vis legitimacy building for these internationalizing firms. Using a large sample of domestic and cross-border acquisitions over the period 1999-2009, we find that the legitimacy-building event generated a positive stock market expectation about the acquisition performance of Indian multinational companies in their foreign investments. In the post-legitimacy period, companies investing abroad generated around 4 percent more short-term shareholder returns on average (equivalent to 18 percent monthly returns) than firms acquiring within their own borders. These postlegitimacy abnormal returns are mainly driven by euphoria generated around the Goldman Sachs report. Indeed, over 2004 Indeed, over -2009 (measured by trading volume) was significantly higher for cross-border acquisitions than domestic acquisitions. By looking at cross-border deals only, we are able to investigate the temporal effect of euphoria for Indian companies. Consistent with theory, the post-legitimacy euphoria effect emphasized above is short-lived, i.e., the overoptimism of investors towards cross-border acquisitions is concentrated in the few years after the publication of the Goldman Sachs report (over 2004-2006) and doesn't exist outside of this period. Hence, our paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on the importance of euphoria in the legitimation process of Indian companies undertaking cross-border acquisitions.
As with any study, this work is not without some limitations. Focusing on publicly listed companies implies that our results need to be reflected under the cognizance that private firms might have different motivations for acquisitions and experience dissimilar results from those observed for public companies. We acknowledge this selection bias in our study. Another possible limitation is the event study methodology used. This method has been frequently used in other works on international business (Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Gubbi et al., 2010) , and it focuses on the short-run abnormal share price reaction to acquisition announcements. Hence we make the implicit assumption that shareholders are the dominant players who shape and drive strategic choices within a firm and that the stock market is efficient, i.e., all information related to the company and its expected future performance is incorporated in its stock price (Binder, 1998; Gubbi et al., 2010) .
Our study has implications for practice and research. This paper highlights the fickleness of legitimation in foreign acquisitions. The positive value differential generated during cross-border acquisitions subsides over a period of time. One possible explanation is that as companies struggle to derive value from their foreign investments, the domestic stock market becomes skeptical of any future investments abroad. Another explanation is that investors reward domestic consolidation after the legitimacy-building event, which signifies improvement in firms' survival rates and financial stability (Goldberg et al., 2000) . A third explanation is that domestic acquisitions are led by profitable firms and thus stock markets predict a potential for transfer of superior corporate governance methods to the acquired firms (Gubbi et al., 2010) . This explanation corroborates previous empirical evidence (Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Dewenter, 1995; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005) . It is also likely that these converging returns between domestic and foreign acquisitions are driven by the booming domestic market. 7 Thus, we argue that although in the short term euphoria creates value-enhancing investment opportunities for Indian firms acquiring abroad, in the long term rapidly growing domestic sectors are likely to create similar opportunities for value creation at home.
Finally, focusing on Indian bidders to test our hypotheses does not undermine our results as India is the biggest market in terms of transactions (especially cross-border deals) within emerging economies. An interesting area for future research would be to investigate such euphoria effect in countries with similar level of development and international exposure like the N-11 countries. Overall, we believe that our research will act as a stepping stone for a series of interesting questions and answers in the future. 
Appendix. Robustness Checks Test Outcome
Alternative proxies for the stock market index: BSE-30
and BSE-100 market indices
Our conclusions remain the same.
Different time windows (3-day and 11-day) (Gubbi et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2008a) Our conclusions remain the same.
The data was screened out for any event where there was an overlap between two deal announcements (Gubbi et al., 2010; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) The analysis of nonconfounding events led to no changes in our results
Alternative industry classification: we reclassified each deal using the SIC of bidders and targets. The Same Industry variable was equal to one for acquirers and targets with the same SIC code.
Alternate economic and legal institutions variables: Same
Language was replaced by Legal Distance (highly correlated).
Outliers: we removed outliers from our sample (10% at top and bottom end each year). Similarly, we conducted the analysis for positive CARs and negative CARs separately.
Year dummies were added to the cross-sectional regressions to control for fixed effects.
Our results are similar to those presented in this paper.
